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ABSTRACT 
 
An “Assessment of the Impact of Russian Nuclear Fleet Operations on Far Eastern Coastal 
Regions” is being performed as part of the Radiation Safety of the Biosphere Project (RAD) of 
the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) of Laxenburg, Austria. To the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive unclassified analysis of the potential 
impact of accidents at the Russian Far East nuclear submarine sites near Vladivostok and 
Petropavlovsk. We have defined the situation there based upon available information and studies 
commissioned by RAD in collaboration with Russian research institutes including Russian 
Research Center-“Kurchatov Institute”, Institute of Northern Environmental Problems and 
Lazurit Central Design Bureau. Further, in our original work, some in collaboration with the staff 
of the Danish Meteorological Institute (DMI) and members of the Japan Atomic Energy 
Research Institute, we have calculated the nuclide trajectories from these sites in the atmospheric 
boundary layer, less than 1.5 kilometers high, and determined their probability of crossing any of 
the nearby countries as well as Asiatic Russia. We have further determined the concentrations in 
each of these crossings as well as the total, dry and wet depositions of nuclides on these areas. 
Finally, we have calculated the doses to the Japanese Island population from typical winter 
airflow patterns (those most likely to cross the Islands in the minimum times), strong north 
winds, weak north winds and cyclonic winds for conditions similar to the Chazhma Bay 
criticality accident (fresh fuel) and for a criticality accident for the same type of reactor with fuel 
being withdrawn (spent fuel). The maximum individual committed dosages were less than 2 x 
10-7 and 2 x 10-3 mSv, respectively. The long-term external doses by radionuclides deposited on 
the ground and the internal doses by consumption of foods were not evaluated as it is believed 
that such doses can be avoided by social controls. In other calculations taking these longer term 
doses into account and determining the sum of the maximum individual committed dosages 
(SMICD), we found for each of the surrounding countries to be less than 1 mSv. In that part of 
Russia the (SMICD) is less than 6 mSv. For releases from the Petropavlovsk sites the (SMICD) 
for each of the surrounding countries is less than 0.3 mSv. In that part of Russia the (SMICD) is 
less than 6 mSv. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Concern about environmental radioactive contamination has been intense for many years and 
particularly about conditions in the USA and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) because of 
conditions that prevailed in the development and testing of nuclear weapons during World War II 
and the Cold War. The recent film, “K-19: the Widowmaker” (1), based on a true incident 
aboard a Soviet nuclear submarine made clear to the general public the problems inherent in 
nuclear energy when accidents occur. Revelations about these wartime conditions in the USA 
started to become known in the 1970s but accelerated after the 1984 court case that resulted in 
the Department of Energy being forced to open its sites to federal and state environmental 
regulatory authorities (2). Since then, there have been many articles, reports and books on the 
topic including DOE’s report (3) and many dose reconstruction reports dealing with specific sites 
such as the Oak Ridge report (4). Prior to dissolution of the Former Soviet Union, Environmental 
conditions in the Soviet Union were largely unknown though there were unofficial reports of 
conditions there (5). Only after Perestroika did it become possible for more details to emerge 
though there are still many unknowns. There are 2 books that discuss what is publicly known 
about radioactive environmental conditions in the FSU (6,7). (There are many Web sites with 
information and some of the more important are given later in the paper.) 
 
The latter book was prepared as a joint effort of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy 
(Minatom) and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg, 
Austria. (7) The USA and the Soviet Union founded IIASA in 1972 as an organization where 
their scientists and engineers could work together on problems of mutual interest even during the 
Cold War. Since that time over 16 countries have joined, primarily through their National 
Academies of Sciences. In 1994, the Radiation Safety of the Biosphere Project (RAD) was 
initiated to study the nuclear environmental impacts of the Cold War. The first objective was to 
compare the impacts upon the USA and the Former Soviet Union where the earliest major efforts 
were carried out and where data indicated that the impacts had been the greatest. As indicated 
above, because of the disparity in the information available on conditions in the USA and the 
FSU, comparisons could not be made until more information was available on conditions in the 
FSU. Therefore, the first RAD studies were on conditions at the three large spent fuel 
reprocessing centers in Russia, Mayak, Krasnoyarsk-26 and Tomsk-7 where the greatest amount 
of radioactive material was in the environment (8). The next most important centers of concern 
were the conditions at bases of the Russian Northern and Pacific nuclear fleets, Murmansk and 
vicinity and Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk, Kamchatka and their vicinity, respectively. (6,7) 
Though there are other Russian fleets, these are the only ones with nuclear ships. There are 
different numbers published for the submarines in each fleet, the number that have been 
decommissioned and the state of the spent fuel and the hulls from a variety of Russian and other 
reports, we have chosen to use what were the official numbers used in our joint book (7) and 
recent figures presented by the Deputy Minister of Minatom, Table 1 (9). 
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Table I Nuclear Submarines Decommissioned in Russia December 2000 (9) 
 
The different estimates do not vary sufficiently to markedly change the impact. About 250 
nuclear submarines were built in the Former Soviet Union and close to 200 have been retired. 
Over half of the submarines withdrawn from service are in the Northern Fleet. Russia is 
experiencing problems with the infrastructure and equipment to dismantle these submarines and 
to process their spent fuel. Spent fuel is stored in obsolete onshore and floating storage facilities, 
inside reactors of retired submarines at dockside at the shore facilities and in transport 
containers. Many of the withdrawn submarines are moored at naval bases and in many cases 
have their nuclear fuel aboard. In addition, their operational wastes and discharged spent nuclear 
fuel are held in floating or dockside stores under conditions which in many cases do not meet 
current Russian regulations. In some instances, the spent fuel cannot be removed from the 
reactors or stores with normal equipment. There is a lack of transport trains to take the spent fuel 
to Mayak for reprocessing and in some cases reprocessing is not possible with present 
equipment.  
 
NORTHERN FLEET 
 
 Conditions of the Northern fleet at Murmansk and vicinity have been studied by many groups, 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)(10), CEG (Contact Expert Group)(11), Arctic 
Military Environmental Cooperation, (AMEC)(12), Minatom (13), Bellona(14), etc. The 
Strategy Working Group of the CEG reported that “The Spent Nuclear Fuel at the Naval Bases in 
NW Russia currently creates a significant risk of: 
- criticality accidents which could lead to the release of fission products into the atmosphere 
and sea 
- ingress of water into the stores, or sinking of the floating stores, leading to contamination 
of the sea 
- diversion of high-enriched fuel, with implications for terrorism and proliferation of 
nuclear weapons.” (15) 
 
A seminar “The Ecological Problems of the Nuclear Powered Submarines (NPS) 
Decommissioning” was recently, July 4-9, 2001, held at Severodvinsk, Russia where problems 
of the Northern Fleet were discussed in detail. (16) They stated that “retired nuclear powered 
submarines (NPS) are a threat not for Russia only but also for other countries. Nuclear and 
radiation safety, prevention of radionuclides spreading into environment from reactor 
compartments, solid and liquid radioactive waste is the essential condition for the ecological 
safety, ensuring and environment effect elimination”. They then listed 13 needs, some of them 
quite generic but others quite specific such as “rehabilitation of facilities and area of the 
Submarines Northern Fleet Pacific Fleet
Written-off from the Navy 108 76
With unloaded spent nuclear fuel (SNF) 48 32
 from the reactors
With SNF non-unloaded from the reactors 60 44
Dismantled with formation of single-, three- 42 18
and multi-compartment units
sent to plants for scrapping 29
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available on-shore technological facilities, first at the area of Andreev Bay”. Despite the 
similarity in the problems at the Pacific Fleet’s sites, comparatively little work had been done to 
determine the exact conditions there. 
 
PACIFIC FLEET 
 
There was so little information presented at this conference on the conditions at the Pacific Fleet 
sites that it was recommended that a similar conference be held in the Far East in the following 
year. The suggested international conference,  “Ecological Problems in Nuclear-Powered 
Submarines Decommissioning and the Development of Nuclear Power in the Region” 
(ECOFLOT-2) was held at Vladivostok, Russia, September 16-20, 2002 where the problems at 
the Pacific Fleet sites were discussed (17). The Chief of the Ecological Safety of the Armed 
Forces of the Russian Federation, A.I. Yunak, stated “Since the 1980s of the last century the 
nuclear powered submarines decommissioning rate has greatly increased. It has become obvious 
that the recycling capacities of the Navy ship-repair yards and civil industry are low and do not 
meet the recycling rate. This has resulted in the accumulation of retired submarines in the places 
of stationing in the Kamchatka and Primorie. Besides the NPS decommissioned, of great concern 
for the Navy are the vessels of atomic technological servicing accumulated in the Kamchatka and 
Primorie that are also retired and are to be recycled.”(18) In fact, 2 decommissioned submarines 
sunk off the northeastern Kamachatka Peninsula in 1997 and 1999 (19). 
 
However, problems in the Far East had come to the world’s attention earlier when a criticality 
accident with a new core occurred on the submarine K-314 in Chazhma Bay, near Vladivostok, 
during refueling on August 10, 1985. Ten people were killed and the local area was 
contaminated (20). 
 
Because so little external analysis had been devoted to conditions at the Far East, IIASA decided 
to concentrate its next efforts on conditions there. The main nuclear areas of concern in the 
Russian Far East are the home bases of the Pacific Fleet at Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk as the 
Russians have only one nuclear power facility in the Far East at Bilibino where there are 4 light 
water cooled, graphite moderated reactors of 12 MWe each. Further, fuel on Kamchatka cannot, 
at present, be shipped to Vladivostok area for transport to Mayak for storage in secure 
circumstances or reprocessing. Even shipment from the Vladivostok area is problematic at the 
present time. 
 
Based upon this and upon analysis of conditions at the Northern Fleet and analysis of the impact 
of discharges to the open ocean (21) it became obvious that though local conditions could be 
severe, there was not sufficient unclassified information available to analyze them. It was also 
obvious that the only other major technical impact would be by atmospheric transport. It was 
decided to look at transboundary atmospheric impacts. At about the same time, it was becoming 
apparent that air masses from the Asian continent could move rapidly and only slightly diluted 
across the Pacific Ocean (22,23). This lent a degree of urgency to the studies. It was also 
apparent from the studies that Japan and the USA territories could be impacted.  
 
The climate of the North Pacific is complex because of significant variations in the radiative 
effects at the ground surface, the unequal distribution of land and water surfaces over which the 
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winds travel and the horizontal transport of heat energy toward the northern latitudes from the 
south. In addition, the important processes such as wind field characteristics, temperature and 
humidity fields, precipitation in various forms, etc. take place in numerous scales, local-, meso-, 
regional-, large-, hemispheric and global. The wind patterns in the southern and eastern parts of 
the North Pacific region are remarkably uniform. The western part of the North Pacific is 
dependent upon the monsoons. During the summer rainy season, winds blow from the ocean 
toward the land. During the dry winter season, winds blow from the Asian continent toward the 
ocean. The three centers of major atmospheric activity, Aleutian Low, Siberian (Asian) High and 
the Honolulu High influence the transport of air masses within the North Pacific and Arctic 
regions. During the winter the Siberian High covers most of northeastern Asia and the Aleutian 
Low dominates the northern part of the Pacific Ocean resulting in the prevailing flows of the air 
from Asia towards the Aleutian Chain. In the summer time these conditions are reversed and the 
prevailing flows are in the opposite direction. Because we are interested in the impact on people, 
we also need to take into account the precipitation in the region as it can wash large amounts of 
the radionuclides out of the atmosphere. In the far northern regions during the winter the low 
temperatures and the limited low-level moisture supply will limit the washout during this period. 
In summer-fall time period, the intensity of cyclone development will depend greatly on the 
conditions of the underlying surfaces. In spring there is the intense transport of heat and moisture 
from southern to the northern latitudes that triggers cyclone development. The air parcel 
movements in the North Pacific can vary widely with season and latitude and longitude of origin 
of the pollutants. Figure 1a and 1b show the annual trajectories from the Petropavlovsk and 
Vladivostok areas, respectively. (24)  
 
 
                 (a)              (b) 
Figure 1 Annual atmospheric transport pathways from the Petropavlovsk (a) and 
Vladivostok (b) Sites 
 
Details of monthly and seasonal flows are shown in the report. From the computer files, it is also 
possible to study individual days when there is sufficient meteorological data to input.    
 
In considering accidents aboard submarines, it is important to realize that the reactors are much 
lower in power, 65-70 MWt, (details of nuclear submarine reactors are classified but the nuclear 
powered ice breakers are said to have similar reactors). These numbers are taken from a Bellona 
report (25) and are more than a magnitude lower than a nominal civilian power reactor of 1000 
MWe. Despite the classification, the Russians have suggested using a “theoretical submarine” 
that has 65 canisters, each containing 7 spent fuel assemblies, per reactor.(26) They have stated 
that a number of submarines at dockside have low buoyancy and about half have fuel on board.  
WM’03 Conference, February 23-27, 2003, Tucson, AZ 
 6
 
A paper commissioned by IIASA reanalyzed the Chazma Bay accident (27) to give us further 
insight into local impact. Sivintsev has calculated that only 5 x 1018 fissions are possible with the 
quantity of fresh fuel in a submarine reactor before it blows apart. Consequently, to get the 
radionuclides high enough into the troposphere requires additional energy inputs such as diesel 
fuel, accelerants from missiles, or oxygen generating chemicals. If the contaminants are not 
injected high enough into the troposphere, they will only have a local effect and not a regional 
and/or global effect.  
 
Our first study on the impact on the Japanese Islands considered 2 reactivity accidents, the 
Chazhma Bay submarine accident to be used as a validation of the model used and a 
hypothetical, worst case accident. (28). Only a single winter time condition, January 1997, was 
analyzed as it had been shown that the predominant flows toward Japan occurred mainly during 
the winter time. A deterministic code, WSPEEDI, (29) was used for the numerical analysis. This 
code is the Worldwide version of System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose 
Information (SPEEDI) developed by Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute.. The accumulated 
external gamma dose during cloud passage is calculated from the time integrated air dose rate. 
The model also takes into account the cumulative committed internal dose due to inhalation 
during the period of time the contaminated air passes the site. The model accounts for complex 
sources, terrain conditions and the heterogeneous non-steady state conditions in the atmosphere. 
The only accidents studied were those that could occur during refueling with fresh fuel and spent 
fuel unloading in the Vladivostok area. 
  
Releases from the Vladivostok sites could reach the Japanese Islands in 12 hours, 36 hours and 
18 hours for the three January 1997 wind conditions that were investigated, strong North winds, 
weak North winds and cyclonic winds, respectively. These analyses show how much the wind 
patterns can vary over a small region in a very short time. It is also clear that China and the 
Korean Peninsula could be reached earlier due to their proximity to the Vladivostok sites. 
Takano’s (28) and Romanova’s (30) analyses were based upon the radionuclide releases from a 
Russian submarine accident reported in a NATO study (31). Using this input data and the wind 
conditions noted above, the doses to the maximally exposed individuals are shown in Table 2 
(32).  
 
It can be seen that the highest dose resulting from a reactivity accident involving fresh fuel is 
expected to occur in Japan under strong north wind conditions but would be less than 2 x 10-7  
mSv. Doses from a reactivity accident involving spent fuel would be higher, less than 2 x 10-3 
mSv in Japan and 2 x 10-3 in Korea. All of these doses would be well below the internationally 
accepted limit of 1 mSv/yr (33). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Estimated Total Dose in Affected Areas of Japan and Korea (mSv) 
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Because of this variability, the impact over the entire year on regional countries has been studied 
(34) (35). There are a number of approaches to modeling atmospheric pollutant transport over 
long distances. The two approaches most commonly used are the isobaric and the isentropic. In 
the isobaric approach it is assumed that air parcels are moving along the surfaces of constant 
pressure while in the isentropic approach, it is assumed that air parcels are moving along the 
surfaces of constant potential temperature. Modeling using fully three-dimensional trajectories 
would be preferable but it requires a larger number of variables and parameters and consequently 
increases computer time for each run. We have chosen the isentropic approach to project the 
mean motion of a diffusing cloud because it provides realistic results with less computational 
effort (36) (37). The calculated trajectories over a reasonable period of time should be in 
agreement with the general synoptic scale patterns. 
 
The countries outside of Russia that are of interest are shown in Figure 2a and 2b. (34)  
 
    
   (a)       (b) 
 
Figure 2. Impacted Regions (a) Eastern North Pacific (b) Western North Pacific  
 
WIND AFFECTED DOSE
PATTERN COUNTRY (mSv)
I-131 1-133 I-135 Cs-137 Cs-134 Sr-90
Strong Japan External 3E-10 6E-09 2E-08 4E-06 4E-07
North Wind Internal 3E-08 6E-08 2E-08 4E-04 4E-05 7E-04
Weak Japan External 3E-10 6E-09 2E-10 4E-06 4E-06
North Wind Internal 3E-08 6E-09 2E-10 4E-04 4E-05 7E-04
Cyclonic Japan External 3E-10 6E-09 2E-09 4E-06 4E-06
Wind Internal 3E-09 6E-09 2E-09 4E-04 4E-05 7E-04
Korea External 3E-10 6E-10 2E-09 4E-06 4E-06
Internal 3E-09 6E-09 2E-09 4E-04 4E-06 7E-04
FRESH FUEL
REACTIVITY ACCIDENT: REACTIVITY ACCIDENT:
SPENT FUEL
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The contiguous US was not considered as on the average it takes more than 5 days to reach those 
regions from the Pacific Fleet’s centers, the reduction in accuracy after 5 days of transport and 
the increased computer resources needed for statistical analyses of the longer time series. 
 
To speed our studies we joined with the Danish Meteorological Institute (DMI) (38) where a 
number of models and methodology had been developed in the course of its Arctic Risk Studies. 
Fuller discussion of the results of this collaboration is found in our joint publication, 
“Probabilistic Analysis of Atmospheric Transport and Deposition Patterns from Nuclear Risk 
Sites in Russian Far East” (34) Four major models and techniques were used: (1) Isentropic 
Trajectory Model (39), (2) Long range Transport and Dispersion model-Danish Emergency 
Response Model of the Atmosphere (40), (3) Cluster analysis (34) and (4) probability field 
analysis (41). To the results of these studies, we added the dose analysis (42). 
 
The most critical item in the analysis, after obtaining suitable models, is sufficient and accurate 
data. We used the gridded Dataset DS082.0-NCEP Global Troposphere Analyses (from 1987 till 
April 1996) (43) to calculate five day forward trajectories from Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk. 
For the atmospheric transport and deposition we used the meteorological data from the European 
Center for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (44). For cluster analysis we used the SAS 
methodology (45) as described in (46) that showed the major airflow patterns as shown in Figure 
1. The probabilistic analysis of these airflows was carried out to provide a general overview of 
the likely direction of the radioactive cloud as well as the probability that it would reach or pass 
any particular geographical area. The typical transport times to each of the geographical regions 
studied were calculated. Because some of the radionuclides of interest, such as I-131, have 
relatively short half-lives and because dispersion and dilution increase with transport time, the 
sites reached in 1 and 5 days were also calculated. See Mahura (34) for more detailed analysis of 
the results. For example, for radionuclides injected into the boundary layer, ~1500 m, 32% of all 
forward trajectories would reach the North Japan region but if one takes the percentage of days 
that at least one trajectory reaches the North Japan region, the percentage increases to 54.5. They 
could be considered the upper and lower bounds of the probability of an impact on that region 
from a short term, less than one hour, and a longer term, several hours, release.  
 
For both Vladivostok and Petropavlosk sites, westerly flow is dominant throughout the year. The 
flows occur more than 60% of the time within the boundary layer, less than1.5 km above sea 
level, and 85% of the time at higher altitudes, above 3 km above sea level. For the Vladivostok 
sites, North China, 35-87%, and North Japan, 32-54%, regions are at the highest risk of possible 
impact because of their proximity to the release sites and the prevailing wind patterns. The 
probability of impact is lower for the Korean peninsula as the airflow patterns are generally of 
western origin. On average, atmospheric transport to northern China is likely to require less than 
1 day and only slightly over 1 day to reach northern Japan. These aggregated numbers hide the 
daily and monthly variability of these trajectories shown in Figure 3. (34)  
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Figure 3a. Monthly Average Transport Times from Petropavlovsk Sites to the Impacted 
Regions 
 
 
Figure 3b. Monthly Variations in the number of trajectories originating at low altitudes 
within the boundary layer in Kamchatka Oblast and reaching impacted regions in the 
Eastern Pacific 
 
Except for US territories, radionuclides transported within the boundary layer reach all other 
regions more than half the time. For the Petropavlovsk sites, US regions are at the highest risks. 
The lower and upper bounds of the probability of impact for the Aleutian Islands are 30-54% and 
for Alaska 13-32%. Average transport time to these regions is 3 and 5 days, respectively. The 
likelihood of impact is less than 10% for all other regions. Only the Aleutian Islands are reached 
in less than one day in greater than a few percent of the time. The trajectory studies did not take 
into account the dispersion of the contaminants in the atmosphere nor the reduction due to 
radioactive decay and wet and dry washout. 
 
The next studies took into account dispersion and washout. The details are also given in (34). 
The parameters examined in a probabilistic sense were airflow, precipitation and relative 
humidity, fast transport, mixing height layer, dry, wet and total deposition concentrations and 
doses. Several assumptions were made for this part of the study: 1. Continuous hypothetical 
release of 1010 Bq/sec of 137Cs for one day.(this release is similar to that calculated in the NATO 
studies for releases from 1 reactor in a nuclear submarine) 2. Only one, key radionuclide, Cs-
137, was considered. 3. Simulation was on a daily basis for 5 days. 4. Only one year, 2000, was 
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modeled because of computer time constraints. For worst case analyses, based upon the 
conditions in 2000, specific days were modeled and then later used for the dose analyses. 
 
As would be expected at both Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk sites, the integrated atmospheric 
and the dry deposition concentrations were higher in the vicinity of the sites and decreased with 
distance. They also had elliptical deposition patterns reflecting the dominant airflow patterns 
such as was seen in the East Urals Trace. Though wet deposition is also high near the Fleet sites, 
it is strongly dependent on the rainfall patterns that are frequently cellular. As has been observed 
elsewhere, the areas with wet deposition can have concentrations an order of magnitude greater 
than areas with only dry deposition.   
 
Releases of 10 x 1010 Bq/sec with a puff release every 60 minutes of 137Cs for one day from the 
Vladivostok sites result in integrated concentrations of 10-1 Bq-h/m3 at the seashore of China 
during October-November and March. The same concentrations occurred over the Aleutian 
Islands Chain during March-April and October-December. However, over the Japanese 
territories it is higher than 10+1 Bq-h/m3 during October-April. The dry deposition over the 
Japanese territories will be higher than 10+2 Bq/m2 during October-November. During December-
February and October-November, the populated territories with the deposition 
higher than 101 Bq/m2 are situated to southeast and southwest of the site, respectively. The total 
area where wet deposition is higher than 100 Bq/m2 will be larger during November-April in 
comparison with other months. The Japanese territories are minimally affected by wet deposition 
during July, and highly affected during September-April. During summer months, the wet 
deposition field is limited to a 1500 km circle around the site.  
 
For the Petropavlovsk sites, releases of 10 x 1010 Bq/sec with a puff release every 60 minutes of 
137Cs for one day resulted in integral concentrations during October-March and August, at the 
western shore of the State of Alaska of 100 Bq·h/m3. During January-May and September, 
integral concentration over the northern territories of Japan is 10-1 Bq·h/m3, although in other 
months these territories appear unaffected. The dry deposition during March, July, and 
September, at the western shore of the State of Alaska is 10-1 Bq/m2. During June-August and 
October-November, the territory of Japan appears unaffected, although in other months 
radionuclides might be deposited there in concentrations up to 0.5·10+1 Bq/m2 at any day of a 
month. During January, over the northeastern territories of China the deposition concentration is 
101 Bq/m2. The total area of the wet deposition field increases significantly during November-
February reaching a maximum in December, with a minimum during summer months. During 
winter months, there are local maximums of wet deposition over the Russian Far East and State 
of Alaska territories. During summer months, the wet deposition field is more extended in the 
northeastern direction from the site, although in other months it propagates more in the eastern 
direction. This field diminishes significantly during June-September. During January, a large 
area of the continental Asian part of Russia is also affected by wet deposition.  The annual 
integrated concentration (a) and dry deposition (b) for 2000 for Cs-137 releases are shown in 
Figure 4. 
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(a)       Petropavlovsk  (b) 
 
Figure 4. Integrated Concentration (a) and Dry Deposition (b) for 2000 for Cs-137 Releases 
 
Mahura (34) only provided the deposition and integrated atmospheric concentrations for 137Cs 
but determined that reasonable estimates for Sr-90 and I-131 concentrations could be made from 
the available Cs-137 information. The simplest relationship between Sr-90 or I-131 and Cs-137 
concentrations is a linear one. To see if such a relationship is reasonable, Brown (42) used the 
data from the five worst cases to see if a unique, linear relationship exists between them. He used 
S-Plus (47) to show that the 10 pair-wise correlations between the I-131 (at the desired time 
period in hours) and Cs-137 data and those for the Sr-90 versus Cs-137 manifested high 
correlations. Therefore, he used simple, linear relationships to estimate the Sr-90 and I-131 
deposition data from the calculated Cs-137 information. Using the transfer factors from the 
UNSCEAR (48) methodology, he computed the effective dose commitments for the maximum 
total depositions for Cs-137, Sr-90, and I-131 for the Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk sites.(42)  
 
Table 3.Maximum Total Dose Commitment (per Person) Estimates by Pathways from Cs-137 
Releases at Petropavlovsk Sites using UNSCEAR Methodology 
   
 
 
Region Maximum 
Total 
Ingestion Ingestion Inhalation Inhalation External 
Exposure 
External 
Exposure 
 (mSv) (mSv) (%) (mSv) (%) (mSv) (%) 
 Regional 4E+00 2E+00 36 3E-03 0.1 3E+00 64 
China 3E-02 1E-02 36 2E-05 0.1 2E-02 64 
Japan 4E-02 2E-02 36 3E-05 0.1 3E-02 64 
Mongolia 2E-03 6E-04 36 1E-06 0.1 1E-03 64 
N. Korea 8E-03 3E-03 36 6E-06 0.1 5E-03 64 
Russia 4E+00 2E+00 36 3E-03 0.1 3E+00 64 
S. Korea 6E-04 2E-04 36 5E-07 0.1 4E-04 64 
Aleutians 1E-01 5E-02 36 9E-05 0.1 8E-02 64 
USA Main 2E-01 7E-02 36 1E-04 0.1 1E-01 64 
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Here, we show only the results for the Petropavlovsk sites for Cs-137 in Table 3 as they have the 
greatest effect on US territories. We show the rounded total maximum effective dose 
commitment for the region and each country as well as the components of the total by type (i.e. 
ingestion, inhalation, and external exposure) from releases from the Petropavlovsk. Those 
regions that were not affected are not shown in the tables. Similar results can be shown for Sr-90 
and I-131 but only the totals are shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 Maximum Total Individual Dose Commitments from Cs-137, Sr-90 and I-131 Releases 
at  Petropavlovsk and Vladivostok Sites using UNSCEAR Methodology  
 
   (a) Petropavlovsk     (b) Vladivostok 
 
On the basis of individual countries, the dose commitments in Table 4 can be summarized by the 
following order:  
 
 For Petropavlovsk: Regional = Russia >> USA Main > Aleutians > Japan > China > N. Korea > 
Mongolia > S. Korea.  
 
That is, for releases from the Petropavlovsk sites, the maximum dose commitment is found in 
Russia and is almost two orders of magnitude higher than that for any country. It should be noted 
that separating the Aleutian Islands from the U.S. mainland, as in this study, had little impact on 
the results. Further it should be noted that even for the maximum case, Russia, the sum of the 
maximums is only 6 mSv. 
 
For Vladivostok: Region = Russia > China > N. Korea > Japan > Taiwan > USA Main > 
Mongolia > Aleutians > Hong Kong > Vietnam 
 
Therefore, even though the maximum dose commitment resides in Russia (as found for the 
Petropavlovk releases), the values for other surrounding countries (e.g., China, N. Korea, and 
Japan) are not orders of magnitude lower than that for Russia, but only approximately four to 
Isotope Cs-137 Sr-90 I-131
MaxTotal MaxTotal MaxTotal
Region (mSv) (mSv) (mSv)
Regional 4E+00 2E+00 2E-01
China 3E-02 1E-02 3E-10
Japan 4E-02 2E-02 2E-04
Mongolia 2E-03 6E-04
N. Korea 8E-03 3E-03
Russia 4E+00 2E+00 2E-01
S. Korea 6E-04 1E-04
Aleutians 1E-01 5E-02 2E-03
USA Main 2E-01 8E-02 2E-04
Vietnam
Isotope Cs-137 Sr-90 I-131
MaxTotal MaxTotal MaxTotal
Region (mSv) (mSv) (mSv)
Regional 4E+00 2E+00 3E-01
China 1E+00 4E-01 7E-02
Hong Kong 8E-04 1E-07
Japan 6E-01 2E-01 1E-02
Mongolia 1E-02 4E-03 3E-09
N. Korea 6E-01 3E-01 4E-02
Russia 4E+00 2E+00 3E-01
S. Korea 2E-01 7E-02 6E-03
Taiwan 3E-02 1E-02
Aleutians 9E-03 3E-03 4E-05
USA Main 2E-02 2E-03 3E-17
Vietnam 4E-10 3E-14
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eight times lower. Further it should be noted that even for the maximum case, Russia, the sum of 
the maximums is only 6 mSv. 
 
Conclusions 
 
To the best of our knowledge, this first comprehensive unclassified analysis of the potential 
impact of accidents at the Russian Far East nuclear submarine sites near Vladivostok and 
Petropavlovsk has defined the situation there based upon available information and studies 
commissioned by the Radiation Safety of the Biosphere Project of the International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis. Further, in our original work, some in collaboration with the Danish 
Meteorological Institute and the Japanese Atomic Energy Research Institute, we have calculated 
the nuclide trajectories from these sites in the atmospheric boundary layer, less than 1.5 
kilometers high, and determined their probability of crossing any of the nearby countries as well 
as Asiatic Russia. We have further determined the concentrations in each of these crossings as 
well as the total, dry and wet depositions of nuclides on these areas. Finally, we have calculated 
the doses to the Japanese Island population from typical winter airflow patterns (those most 
likely to cross the Islands in the minimum times), strong north winds, weak north winds and 
cyclonic winds using Japanese codes for conditions similar to the Chazhma Bay criticality 
accident (fresh fuel) and for a criticality accident for the same type of reactor with fuel being 
withdrawn (spent fuel). The maximum individual committed dosages were less than 2 x 10-7 and 
2 x 10-3 mSv, respectively. The long-term external doses by radionuclides deposited on the 
ground and the internal dose by consumption of foods were not evaluated, as it is believed that 
such doses can be avoided by social controls.  
 
In a more detailed analysis using Danish codes and taking these longer term doses into account, 
we have further calculated the maximum individual committed dosages from the Petropavlovsk 
and Vladivostok sites for Russia and each of the surrounding countries. The sum of the 
maximum individual committed dosages (SMICD) from the Petropavlovsk sites were less than 
0.3 mSv except for Russia where the (SMICD) was less than 6 mSv. The (SMICD) from the 
Vladivostok sites were less than 1 mSv except for Russia where it was less than 6 mSv.  
 
These dosages were only for criticality accidents from a single submarine reactor and where the 
nuclide cloud did not rise above 1.5 kilometers. The probabilities of criticality incidents where 
there is storage of more than 1 core in facilities onshore or afloat and with added energy from 
other possible sources should be studied as they most likely would produce greater dosages. 
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